Paradox, Incompleteness and Labyrinth in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre

This paper studies cases of paradox and circular formulations from the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/1795 until the Wissenschaftslehre of 1805. Such formulae are required to produce some of the main concepts of Fichte’s thought, and allow us to draw both systematic and historical...

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Autore principale: Ferrer, Diogo
Natura: Article ou chapitre numérique
Lingua:Anglais
Pubblicazione: Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte 2026
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ref_676 https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.676 urn:doi:10.4000/ref.676 en https://journals.openedition.org/ref/676 2026-06-09T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/jqdx All rights reserved Paradox, Incompleteness and Labyrinth in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte Universidade Federal do Espirito Santo info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2258-014X URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref Ferrer, Diogo paradox circular argument incompleteness This paper studies cases of paradox and circular formulations from the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/1795 until the Wissenschaftslehre of 1805. Such formulae are required to produce some of the main concepts of Fichte’s thought, and allow us to draw both systematic and historical-conceptual conclusions about it. After a general presentation of the form and development of the WL, some examples of paradoxical or circular formulae are studied: As a conclusion it is shown why in the WL “we do not so much explain the explicandum as show, rather, that, and why, it is inexplicable.” The paradox and circular formulae converge on an interpretation of Fichte’s Science of Knowledge as a self-referent and self-contained system of incompleteness.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Anglais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic paradox
circular argument
incompleteness
spellingShingle paradox
circular argument
incompleteness
Ferrer, Diogo
Paradox, Incompleteness and Labyrinth in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre
description This paper studies cases of paradox and circular formulations from the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/1795 until the Wissenschaftslehre of 1805. Such formulae are required to produce some of the main concepts of Fichte’s thought, and allow us to draw both systematic and historical-conceptual conclusions about it. After a general presentation of the form and development of the WL, some examples of paradoxical or circular formulae are studied: As a conclusion it is shown why in the WL “we do not so much explain the explicandum as show, rather, that, and why, it is inexplicable.” The paradox and circular formulae converge on an interpretation of Fichte’s Science of Knowledge as a self-referent and self-contained system of incompleteness.
author Ferrer, Diogo
author_facet Ferrer, Diogo
author_sort Ferrer, Diogo
title Paradox, Incompleteness and Labyrinth in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre
title_short Paradox, Incompleteness and Labyrinth in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre
title_full Paradox, Incompleteness and Labyrinth in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre
title_fullStr Paradox, Incompleteness and Labyrinth in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre
title_full_unstemmed Paradox, Incompleteness and Labyrinth in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre
title_sort paradox, incompleteness and labyrinth in fichte’s wissenschaftslehre
publisher Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
publishDate 2026
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.676
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