Fichte e Schelling e o Debate Inaugural do Idalismo Transcendental

Fichte e Schelling e o Debate Inaugural do Idalismo Transcendental

Fichte developed the foundations of transcendental reason according to Kant’s transcendental Idealism. In articles of 1797, the First and the Second Introduction to the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’, Fichte refuted the dogmatic and empiricist perspectives, which were developed as continuers of Kantian critic...

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Autor Principal: Utteich, Luciano Carlos
Formato: Article ou chapitre numérique
Idioma:Portugais
Publicado: Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte 2026
Sujets:
transcendental philosophy
thing-in-itself
transcendental idealism
dogmatism
Acceso en liña:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ref_258 https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.258 urn:doi:10.4000/ref.258 pt https://journals.openedition.org/ref/258 2026-06-09T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/jqax All rights reserved Fichte e Schelling e o Debate Inaugural do Idalismo Transcendental Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte Universidade Federal do Espirito Santo info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2258-014X URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref Utteich, Luciano Carlos transcendental philosophy thing-in-itself transcendental idealism dogmatism Fichte developed the foundations of transcendental reason according to Kant’s transcendental Idealism. In articles of 1797, the First and the Second Introduction to the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’, Fichte refuted the dogmatic and empiricist perspectives, which were developed as continuers of Kantian criticism. Schelling also drafted the refutation of dogmatism and criticism in the text of 1795, ‘Philosophischen Briefen über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus’. From a different refutation strategy, each philosopher settled his own conceptual system. The following we show the outlines of these strategies, pointing what distinguishes each of the approaches.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Portugais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic transcendental philosophy
thing-in-itself
transcendental idealism
dogmatism
spellingShingle transcendental philosophy
thing-in-itself
transcendental idealism
dogmatism
Utteich, Luciano Carlos
Fichte e Schelling e o Debate Inaugural do Idalismo Transcendental
description Fichte developed the foundations of transcendental reason according to Kant’s transcendental Idealism. In articles of 1797, the First and the Second Introduction to the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’, Fichte refuted the dogmatic and empiricist perspectives, which were developed as continuers of Kantian criticism. Schelling also drafted the refutation of dogmatism and criticism in the text of 1795, ‘Philosophischen Briefen über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus’. From a different refutation strategy, each philosopher settled his own conceptual system. The following we show the outlines of these strategies, pointing what distinguishes each of the approaches.
author Utteich, Luciano Carlos
author_facet Utteich, Luciano Carlos
author_sort Utteich, Luciano Carlos
title Fichte e Schelling e o Debate Inaugural do Idalismo Transcendental
title_short Fichte e Schelling e o Debate Inaugural do Idalismo Transcendental
title_full Fichte e Schelling e o Debate Inaugural do Idalismo Transcendental
title_fullStr Fichte e Schelling e o Debate Inaugural do Idalismo Transcendental
title_full_unstemmed Fichte e Schelling e o Debate Inaugural do Idalismo Transcendental
title_sort fichte e schelling e o debate inaugural do idalismo transcendental
publisher Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
publishDate 2026
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.258
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ref/258
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