Austerity, Audit, and Accountability : New Public Management and the Privatisation of Local Audit in England

This paper examines the experience of the local audit reforms in England against the doctrines and principles of New Public Management (NPM). NPM is a term applied to public sector reforms which aim to enhance both performance and accountability by adopting governance and accountability mechanisms f...

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保存先:
書誌詳細
出版年:URI:https://journals.openedition.org/osb,
第一著者: Greenwood, Margaret
フォーマット: Article ou chapitre numérique
言語:Anglais
出版事項: Observatoire de la société britannique 2018
主題:
オンライン・アクセス:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:osb_1925 https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.1925 urn:doi:10.4000/osb.1925 en https://journals.openedition.org/osb/1925 2018-01-26T01:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/is3j All rights reserved Austerity, Audit, and Accountability : New Public Management and the Privatisation of Local Audit in England Observatoire de la société britannique Université de Toulon info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1775-4135 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1957-3383 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/osb Greenwood, Margaret New Public Management rhetoric accountability local authorities in England public audit This paper examines the experience of the local audit reforms in England against the doctrines and principles of New Public Management (NPM). NPM is a term applied to public sector reforms which aim to enhance both performance and accountability by adopting governance and accountability mechanisms from the private sector. The local public audit reforms, which were initiated in England in 2010, abolished the independent specialist Audit Commission, effectively privatising the financial audit function and severely curtailing the extent to which local public bodies are subject to performance audit. As with other state audit bodies, the Audit Commission had acted as both regulator and provider of audit services to local bodies, such as local authorities and local health service organisations. A review of evidence to date shows that short term efficiency gains were made in financial audit and that there is prima facie evidence of greater accountability to local people. However these gains have been made at the cost of : first, a severe reduction in performance audit, a key function of public audit in delivering both democratic and managerial accountability, and second, a longer-term risk to audit quality and thus to the risk of financial mis-statements. In summary, the evidence suggests that the principles of NPM were appropriated to legitimise the reforms, after the decision to abolish the Audit Commission was taken. In contrast, the rhetoric prior to abolition suggests that the reforms were, instead, inspired more by a personal and political agenda than one of rational economic decision making.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Anglais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic New Public Management
rhetoric
accountability
local authorities in England
public audit
spellingShingle New Public Management
rhetoric
accountability
local authorities in England
public audit
Greenwood, Margaret
Austerity, Audit, and Accountability : New Public Management and the Privatisation of Local Audit in England
description This paper examines the experience of the local audit reforms in England against the doctrines and principles of New Public Management (NPM). NPM is a term applied to public sector reforms which aim to enhance both performance and accountability by adopting governance and accountability mechanisms from the private sector. The local public audit reforms, which were initiated in England in 2010, abolished the independent specialist Audit Commission, effectively privatising the financial audit function and severely curtailing the extent to which local public bodies are subject to performance audit. As with other state audit bodies, the Audit Commission had acted as both regulator and provider of audit services to local bodies, such as local authorities and local health service organisations. A review of evidence to date shows that short term efficiency gains were made in financial audit and that there is prima facie evidence of greater accountability to local people. However these gains have been made at the cost of : first, a severe reduction in performance audit, a key function of public audit in delivering both democratic and managerial accountability, and second, a longer-term risk to audit quality and thus to the risk of financial mis-statements. In summary, the evidence suggests that the principles of NPM were appropriated to legitimise the reforms, after the decision to abolish the Audit Commission was taken. In contrast, the rhetoric prior to abolition suggests that the reforms were, instead, inspired more by a personal and political agenda than one of rational economic decision making.
author Greenwood, Margaret
author_facet Greenwood, Margaret
author_sort Greenwood, Margaret
title Austerity, Audit, and Accountability : New Public Management and the Privatisation of Local Audit in England
title_short Austerity, Audit, and Accountability : New Public Management and the Privatisation of Local Audit in England
title_full Austerity, Audit, and Accountability : New Public Management and the Privatisation of Local Audit in England
title_fullStr Austerity, Audit, and Accountability : New Public Management and the Privatisation of Local Audit in England
title_full_unstemmed Austerity, Audit, and Accountability : New Public Management and the Privatisation of Local Audit in England
title_sort austerity, audit, and accountability : new public management and the privatisation of local audit in england
publisher Observatoire de la société britannique
publishDate 2018
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/osb
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.1925
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