The axiomatic characterizations of majority voting and scoring rules
The Arrovian framework of social choice theory is flexible enough to allow for a precise axiomatic study of the voting rules that are used in political elections, sport competitions or expert committees, etc. such as the majority rule or the scoring rules. The objective of this paper is to give an a...
Enregistré dans:
| Dans: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/msh, |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Langue: | Anglais |
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Mathématiques et sciences humaines
2006
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| Accès en ligne: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |