Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis

Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis

This is a response to Charles Travis's article "Is Seeing Intentional?" In it, I argue that while seeing differs from other intentional states in a variety of ways, seeing is indeed intentional, at least in the philosophically central sense of "intentional" introduced to us...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:URI:https://journals.openedition.org/methodos,
1. Verfasser: Hopp, Walter
Format: Article ou chapitre numérique
Sprache:Anglais
Veröffentlicht: Methodos 2014
Schlagworte:
Husserl
perception
intentionality
Brentano
hallucination
Online Zugang:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
id openedition-oai:revues.org:methodos_4108
record_format openedition
spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:methodos_4108 https://doi.org/10.4000/methodos.4108 urn:doi:10.4000/methodos.4108 en https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/4108 2014-05-05T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/i9nt https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis Methodos Savoirs textes langage - UMR 8163 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1769-7379 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1626-0600 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/methodos Hopp, Walter Husserl perception intentionality Brentano hallucination This is a response to Charles Travis's article "Is Seeing Intentional?" In it, I argue that while seeing differs from other intentional states in a variety of ways, seeing is indeed intentional, at least in the philosophically central sense of "intentional" introduced to us by Brentano and Husserl. Seeing is, quite often at least, the consciousness of something. I spend the majority of the paper discussing Travis's arguments that it is not, and providing reasons for thinking they are inconclusive. That seeings do not harbor ambitions and that "sees (NP)" is not an intensional context do not entail that seeings are not intentional. Furthermore, I argue that Travis's contention that states of seeing are relational is inconclusive, and also argue that even if that is so, the proper conclusion to draw is not that seeing is not intentional, but that some intentional states are relational.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Anglais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic Husserl
perception
intentionality
Brentano
hallucination
spellingShingle Husserl
perception
intentionality
Brentano
hallucination
Hopp, Walter
Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis
description This is a response to Charles Travis's article "Is Seeing Intentional?" In it, I argue that while seeing differs from other intentional states in a variety of ways, seeing is indeed intentional, at least in the philosophically central sense of "intentional" introduced to us by Brentano and Husserl. Seeing is, quite often at least, the consciousness of something. I spend the majority of the paper discussing Travis's arguments that it is not, and providing reasons for thinking they are inconclusive. That seeings do not harbor ambitions and that "sees (NP)" is not an intensional context do not entail that seeings are not intentional. Furthermore, I argue that Travis's contention that states of seeing are relational is inconclusive, and also argue that even if that is so, the proper conclusion to draw is not that seeing is not intentional, but that some intentional states are relational.
author Hopp, Walter
author_facet Hopp, Walter
author_sort Hopp, Walter
title Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis
title_short Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis
title_full Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis
title_fullStr Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis
title_full_unstemmed Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis
title_sort is seeing intentional? a response to travis
publisher Methodos
publishDate 2014
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/methodos
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/methodos.4108
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/4108
_version_ 1877243225213763584

Ähnliche Einträge