MARC21: Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies

Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies

Employee stock ownership (ESO) is often associated with reductions in agency costs because it increases employee satisfaction and attachment to their company and aligns the interests of employees with those of their firm. Another stream of research argues that ESO may have the opposite effect on age...

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Pubblicato in:	URI:https://journals.openedition.org/fcs,
Autori principali:	ABDELNOUR, Joseph, AUBERT, Nicolas, CAMPA, Domenico
Natura:	Article ou chapitre numérique
Lingua:	Anglais
Pubblicazione:	Finance Contrôle Stratégie 2023
Soggetti:	Actionnariat salarié Gouvernance d’entreprise Coûts d’agence Honoraires d’audit Partage du capital Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise Corporate governance Agency costs Audit fees Employee stock ownership Shared capitalism Corporate social responsibility
Accesso online:	Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM

id	openedition-oai:revues.org:fcs_10259
record_format	openedition
spelling	openedition-oai:revues.org:fcs_10259 https://doi.org/10.4000/fcs.10259 urn:doi:10.4000/fcs.10259 en https://journals.openedition.org/fcs/10259 2023-01-30T01:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/gau6 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies Finance Contrôle Stratégie Association FCS info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2261-5512 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1287-1141 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/fcs ABDELNOUR, Joseph AUBERT, Nicolas CAMPA, Domenico Actionnariat salarié Gouvernance d’entreprise Coûts d’agence Honoraires d’audit Partage du capital Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise Corporate governance Agency costs Audit fees Employee stock ownership Shared capitalism Corporate social responsibility Employee stock ownership (ESO) is often associated with reductions in agency costs because it increases employee satisfaction and attachment to their company and aligns the interests of employees with those of their firm. Another stream of research argues that ESO may have the opposite effect on agency costs because it serves as a management entrenchment tool and leads to divergence between stakeholders. This paper examines the relationship between ESO and agency costs in France, which is a leading European country for ESO. Using a panel database of 125 firms over the period 2002–2016, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between ESO and agency costs. That evidence highlights that low levels of ESO increase agency costs, which is consistent with managerial entrenchment mechanisms. The findings also suggest that beyond a certain point, ESO reduces agency problems because it links employee wealth to their firm’s success. L'actionnariat salarié (AS) est souvent associé à une diminution des coûts d'agence car il augmente la satisfaction des salariés et leur attachement à leur entreprise et aligne leurs intérêts avec ceux de l'entreprise. Un autre courant de recherche suggère que l'AS peut avoir l'effet inverse sur les coûts d'agence en servant l’enracinement des dirigeants. Il entraînerait une divergence entre les parties prenantes et diminuerait la valeur actionnariale. Cet article étudie la relation entre AS et coûts d'agence en France, un pays leader européen en matière d’AS. Nos analyses sur des données issues de 125 entreprises françaises cotées sur la période 2002-2016 mettent en évidence une relation en U inversé entre l'AS et les coûts d'agence. Nos résultats indiquent que des niveaux faibles ou élevés d’AS sont associés à des coûts d'agence élevés en raison de l’enracinement des dirigeants. Les résultats suggèrent aussi qu’au-delà d’un certain seuil, l'AS réduit les problèmes d'agence en liant le patrimoine des salariés à la performance de leur entreprise.
collection	OpenEdition Journal
language	Anglais
format	Article ou chapitre numérique
building	0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic	Actionnariat salarié Gouvernance d’entreprise Coûts d’agence Honoraires d’audit Partage du capital Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise Corporate governance Agency costs Audit fees Employee stock ownership Shared capitalism Corporate social responsibility
spellingShingle	Actionnariat salarié Gouvernance d’entreprise Coûts d’agence Honoraires d’audit Partage du capital Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise Corporate governance Agency costs Audit fees Employee stock ownership Shared capitalism Corporate social responsibility ABDELNOUR, Joseph AUBERT, Nicolas CAMPA, Domenico Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies
description	Employee stock ownership (ESO) is often associated with reductions in agency costs because it increases employee satisfaction and attachment to their company and aligns the interests of employees with those of their firm. Another stream of research argues that ESO may have the opposite effect on agency costs because it serves as a management entrenchment tool and leads to divergence between stakeholders. This paper examines the relationship between ESO and agency costs in France, which is a leading European country for ESO. Using a panel database of 125 firms over the period 2002–2016, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between ESO and agency costs. That evidence highlights that low levels of ESO increase agency costs, which is consistent with managerial entrenchment mechanisms. The findings also suggest that beyond a certain point, ESO reduces agency problems because it links employee wealth to their firm’s success.
author	ABDELNOUR, Joseph AUBERT, Nicolas CAMPA, Domenico
author_facet	ABDELNOUR, Joseph AUBERT, Nicolas CAMPA, Domenico
author_sort	ABDELNOUR, Joseph
title	Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies
title_short	Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies
title_full	Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies
title_fullStr	Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies
title_full_unstemmed	Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies
title_sort	does employee ownership reduce agency costs? evidence from french listed companies
publisher	Finance Contrôle Stratégie
publishDate	2023
container_title	URI:https://journals.openedition.org/fcs
url	https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/fcs.10259 https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/fcs/10259
_version_	1877292908742180864

Does employee ownership reduce agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies

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