McDowell’s Unexpected Philosophical Ally

In this paper I will explore the philosophical exchange between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell regarding the role of conceptual capacities in our openness to the world. According to Dreyfus, McDowell fails to do justice to instances of embodied coping from which conceptual mindedness is completely...

Descrizione completa

Salvato in:
Dettagli Bibliografici
Pubblicato in:URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap,
Autore principale: Rey, Santiago
Natura: Article ou chapitre numérique
Lingua:Anglais
Pubblicazione: European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 2017
Accesso online:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
id openedition-oai:revues.org:ejpap_742
record_format openedition
spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ejpap_742 https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.742 urn:doi:10.4000/ejpap.742 en https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/742 2017-07-20T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/fn5e https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ McDowell’s Unexpected Philosophical Ally European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy Associazione Pragma info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap Rey, Santiago In this paper I will explore the philosophical exchange between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell regarding the role of conceptual capacities in our openness to the world. According to Dreyfus, McDowell fails to do justice to instances of embodied coping from which conceptual mindedness is completely absent. That is to say, when we are fully, pre-reflectively absorbed in our activities, we respond to the affordances and solicitations of the environment without the assistance of mindedness or conceptual articulation. On Dreyfus’ view, McDowell displays serious symptoms of ‘intellectualism’ – privileging the higher levels of our cognitive abilities and overlooking what occurs in engaged, bodily activity. In order to counter Dreyfus’ objections, McDowell must provide a satisfactory account of the pervasiveness of conceptuality in our openness to the world, without neglecting and distorting the phenomenon of embodied coping. Fortunately, he is not alone in this task: in fact, McDowell is very close to the philosophical tradition of hermeneutics that came into prominence in the twentieth century with thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This affinity, however, is discounted by Dreyfus’ reading of Heidegger with its emphatic insistence on the preconceptual and prelinguistic character of our most basic openness to the world. My main purpose in this paper is to suggest an alternative reading of Heidegger that places him closer to John McDowell, and further removed from Dreyfus’ phenomenology of absorbed coping.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Anglais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
description In this paper I will explore the philosophical exchange between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell regarding the role of conceptual capacities in our openness to the world. According to Dreyfus, McDowell fails to do justice to instances of embodied coping from which conceptual mindedness is completely absent. That is to say, when we are fully, pre-reflectively absorbed in our activities, we respond to the affordances and solicitations of the environment without the assistance of mindedness or conceptual articulation. On Dreyfus’ view, McDowell displays serious symptoms of ‘intellectualism’ – privileging the higher levels of our cognitive abilities and overlooking what occurs in engaged, bodily activity. In order to counter Dreyfus’ objections, McDowell must provide a satisfactory account of the pervasiveness of conceptuality in our openness to the world, without neglecting and distorting the phenomenon of embodied coping. Fortunately, he is not alone in this task: in fact, McDowell is very close to the philosophical tradition of hermeneutics that came into prominence in the twentieth century with thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This affinity, however, is discounted by Dreyfus’ reading of Heidegger with its emphatic insistence on the preconceptual and prelinguistic character of our most basic openness to the world. My main purpose in this paper is to suggest an alternative reading of Heidegger that places him closer to John McDowell, and further removed from Dreyfus’ phenomenology of absorbed coping.
author Rey, Santiago
spellingShingle Rey, Santiago
McDowell’s Unexpected Philosophical Ally
author_facet Rey, Santiago
author_sort Rey, Santiago
title McDowell’s Unexpected Philosophical Ally
title_short McDowell’s Unexpected Philosophical Ally
title_full McDowell’s Unexpected Philosophical Ally
title_fullStr McDowell’s Unexpected Philosophical Ally
title_full_unstemmed McDowell’s Unexpected Philosophical Ally
title_sort mcdowell’s unexpected philosophical ally
publisher European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
publishDate 2017
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.742
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/742
_version_ 1877242252764381184