Having Social Practices in Mind.
This paper clarifies why and how Wittgenstein’s animating idea of social practices should be considered as expressing a fundamental pragmatist commitment.To this end, I do not take the retrospective perspective, which traces “pragmatism” back to the criteria of use fixed by the inventor of the word,...
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| I publikationen: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Materialtyp: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Språk: | Anglais |
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European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2017
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| Länkar: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:ejpap_730 |
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openedition |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:ejpap_730 https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.730 urn:doi:10.4000/ejpap.730 en https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/730 2017-07-20T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/fn58 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Having Social Practices in Mind. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy Associazione Pragma info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap Callegaro, Francesco This paper clarifies why and how Wittgenstein’s animating idea of social practices should be considered as expressing a fundamental pragmatist commitment.To this end, I do not take the retrospective perspective, which traces “pragmatism” back to the criteria of use fixed by the inventor of the word, C. S. Peirce, but rather replace Wittgenstein in the context of contemporary debates. I focus in particular on R. Brandom’s attempt to understand Wittgenstein’s second philosophy as belonging to an intellectual tradition from which his own rationalist pragmatism derives. A confrontation follows between Brandom and Wittgenstein, whose aim is to highlight the specific tactics of Wittgenstein’s pragmatism as a refusal of Brandom’s idealist rationalism. First, I present and defend R. Brandom’s reading of Wittgenstein’s argument on rule-following as a decisive clarification of the general idea of social practices. Second, I criticize Brandom’s narrow Kantian framework, explaining why it prevents us from understanding Wittgenstein’s conception of rules and concepts, and, therefore, of the very normativity of concepts. In light of the distinction between two kinds of conceptual norms, empirical and grammatical, I finally show, through a reading of On certainty, that the function assigned by Wittgenstein to social practices is to account for the conditions of possibility of conceptual contentfullness as expressed in rational activity. |
| collection |
OpenEdition Journal |
| language |
Anglais |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/ |
| description |
This paper clarifies why and how Wittgenstein’s animating idea of social practices should be considered as expressing a fundamental pragmatist commitment.To this end, I do not take the retrospective perspective, which traces “pragmatism” back to the criteria of use fixed by the inventor of the word, C. S. Peirce, but rather replace Wittgenstein in the context of contemporary debates. I focus in particular on R. Brandom’s attempt to understand Wittgenstein’s second philosophy as belonging to an intellectual tradition from which his own rationalist pragmatism derives. A confrontation follows between Brandom and Wittgenstein, whose aim is to highlight the specific tactics of Wittgenstein’s pragmatism as a refusal of Brandom’s idealist rationalism. First, I present and defend R. Brandom’s reading of Wittgenstein’s argument on rule-following as a decisive clarification of the general idea of social practices. Second, I criticize Brandom’s narrow Kantian framework, explaining why it prevents us from understanding Wittgenstein’s conception of rules and concepts, and, therefore, of the very normativity of concepts. In light of the distinction between two kinds of conceptual norms, empirical and grammatical, I finally show, through a reading of On certainty, that the function assigned by Wittgenstein to social practices is to account for the conditions of possibility of conceptual contentfullness as expressed in rational activity. |
| author |
Callegaro, Francesco |
| spellingShingle |
Callegaro, Francesco Having Social Practices in Mind. |
| author_facet |
Callegaro, Francesco |
| author_sort |
Callegaro, Francesco |
| title |
Having Social Practices in Mind. |
| title_short |
Having Social Practices in Mind. |
| title_full |
Having Social Practices in Mind. |
| title_fullStr |
Having Social Practices in Mind. |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Having Social Practices in Mind. |
| title_sort |
having social practices in mind. |
| publisher |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| container_title |
URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap |
| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.730 https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/730 |
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