MARC erregistroa: Training, Training, Training

Training, Training, Training

Both Wittgenstein and Dewey have a role for the concept of skills and techniques in their understanding of practices and thereby the possession of concepts. Skills are typically acquired through training. It can seem, however, that their respective appeals to practice are dissimilar: Dewey’s appeal...

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Argitaratua izan da:	URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap,
Egile nagusia:	Luntley, Michael
Formatua:	Article ou chapitre numérique
Hizkuntza:	Anglais
Argitaratua:	European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 2017
Sarrera elektronikoa:	Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM

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spelling	openedition-oai:revues.org:ejpap_723 https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.723 urn:doi:10.4000/ejpap.723 en https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/723 2017-07-20T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/fn53 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Training, Training, Training European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy Associazione Pragma info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap Luntley, Michael Both Wittgenstein and Dewey have a role for the concept of skills and techniques in their understanding of practices and thereby the possession of concepts. Skills are typically acquired through training. It can seem, however, that their respective appeals to practice are dissimilar: Dewey’s appeal is, like Peirce’s, programmatic. It is meant to do philosophical work. In contrast, for Wittgenstein, the appeal to practice can seem a primitive, something that is meant to put an end to philosophical work. I argue that Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice is much closer to Dewey’s. The argument arises out of difficulties with Wittgenstein’s concept of training. Wittgenstein’s concept of training is inadequate for bridging the trajectory from initial training to the acquisition of skills that are second nature. The latter seems required for his appeal to practice and the way that grasp of concepts is embedded our practices of going on. The inadequacy of Wittgenstein’s concept of training renders the idea of such a trajectory incoherent, for it manifests a real dilemma about how to understand the transition from rote repetitive training to mastery of skillful activity. I show how we can make sense of the role that training plays in developing skillful activity and how by repetitive training we acquire new skills. The solution to the dilemma comes from acknowledging a point that Wittgenstein shares with Dewey concerning the role of selective attention. By acknowledging the role that attention plays in extending the operation of skills, we can make sense of the acquisition of new skills and provide a granularity to the concept of practice that makes Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice more akin to Dewey’s: a programmatic concept rather than a primitive. Practice is, for Wittgenstein, something to be studied and described in a detail that does explanatory work. Furthermore, the account has a number of points of contact with Dewey.
collection	OpenEdition Journal
language	Anglais
format	Article ou chapitre numérique
building	0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
description	Both Wittgenstein and Dewey have a role for the concept of skills and techniques in their understanding of practices and thereby the possession of concepts. Skills are typically acquired through training. It can seem, however, that their respective appeals to practice are dissimilar: Dewey’s appeal is, like Peirce’s, programmatic. It is meant to do philosophical work. In contrast, for Wittgenstein, the appeal to practice can seem a primitive, something that is meant to put an end to philosophical work. I argue that Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice is much closer to Dewey’s. The argument arises out of difficulties with Wittgenstein’s concept of training. Wittgenstein’s concept of training is inadequate for bridging the trajectory from initial training to the acquisition of skills that are second nature. The latter seems required for his appeal to practice and the way that grasp of concepts is embedded our practices of going on. The inadequacy of Wittgenstein’s concept of training renders the idea of such a trajectory incoherent, for it manifests a real dilemma about how to understand the transition from rote repetitive training to mastery of skillful activity. I show how we can make sense of the role that training plays in developing skillful activity and how by repetitive training we acquire new skills. The solution to the dilemma comes from acknowledging a point that Wittgenstein shares with Dewey concerning the role of selective attention. By acknowledging the role that attention plays in extending the operation of skills, we can make sense of the acquisition of new skills and provide a granularity to the concept of practice that makes Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice more akin to Dewey’s: a programmatic concept rather than a primitive. Practice is, for Wittgenstein, something to be studied and described in a detail that does explanatory work. Furthermore, the account has a number of points of contact with Dewey.
author	Luntley, Michael
spellingShingle	Luntley, Michael Training, Training, Training
author_facet	Luntley, Michael
author_sort	Luntley, Michael
title	Training, Training, Training
title_short	Training, Training, Training
title_full	Training, Training, Training
title_fullStr	Training, Training, Training
title_full_unstemmed	Training, Training, Training
title_sort	training, training, training
publisher	European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
publishDate	2017
container_title	URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap
url	https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.723 https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/723
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