Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism

Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism

Debates over the relative priority of experience and language have been among some of the most vexed, but also generative, disputes in pragmatist philosophy over the past few decades. These debates have, however, run into the ground such that both positions find themselves at a definitive standstill...

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Autor principal: Koopman, Colin
Formato: Article ou chapitre numérique
Lenguaje:Anglais
Publicado: European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 2015
Acceso en línea:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ejpap_313 https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.313 urn:doi:10.4000/ejpap.313 en https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/313 2015-11-11T01:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/fn29 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy Associazione Pragma info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap Koopman, Colin Debates over the relative priority of experience and language have been among some of the most vexed, but also generative, disputes in pragmatist philosophy over the past few decades. These debates have, however, run into the ground such that both positions find themselves at a definitive standstill. I argue for a rejuvenation of pragmatism by way of moving beyond both the experience option (here represented by Dewey) and the linguistic turn in pragmatism (here represented by Brandom). We can move beyond these two categories, I argue, by resuscitating the categorical conception that has always been at the heart of pragmatism all along: action or, as I prefer to put it, conduct. In this paper, I develop an argument for “conduct pragmatism” on the basis of a return to William James’s earliest statements of pragmatism, statements that indeed occur prior to the official announcement of “pragmatism” in 1898. I draw on a dispute with Charles Sanders Peirce over the best interpretation of pragmatism as well as on a number of James’s early psychological writings from the 1880s leading up to the Principles of Psychology of 1890. These texts definitively establish that the early James was what I call a “conduct pragmatist” well before his radical empiricism facilitated what was only a late turn toward the “experience pragmatism” that would come to impress Dewey and later scholars of classicopragmatism. The early James thus represents, I argue, a promising seed for a new third generation of pragmatism that may find its way beyond the endings of both experientialism and lingualism, as well as their impasses with one another.
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description Debates over the relative priority of experience and language have been among some of the most vexed, but also generative, disputes in pragmatist philosophy over the past few decades. These debates have, however, run into the ground such that both positions find themselves at a definitive standstill. I argue for a rejuvenation of pragmatism by way of moving beyond both the experience option (here represented by Dewey) and the linguistic turn in pragmatism (here represented by Brandom). We can move beyond these two categories, I argue, by resuscitating the categorical conception that has always been at the heart of pragmatism all along: action or, as I prefer to put it, conduct. In this paper, I develop an argument for “conduct pragmatism” on the basis of a return to William James’s earliest statements of pragmatism, statements that indeed occur prior to the official announcement of “pragmatism” in 1898. I draw on a dispute with Charles Sanders Peirce over the best interpretation of pragmatism as well as on a number of James’s early psychological writings from the 1880s leading up to the Principles of Psychology of 1890. These texts definitively establish that the early James was what I call a “conduct pragmatist” well before his radical empiricism facilitated what was only a late turn toward the “experience pragmatism” that would come to impress Dewey and later scholars of classicopragmatism. The early James thus represents, I argue, a promising seed for a new third generation of pragmatism that may find its way beyond the endings of both experientialism and lingualism, as well as their impasses with one another.
author Koopman, Colin
spellingShingle Koopman, Colin
Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism
author_facet Koopman, Colin
author_sort Koopman, Colin
title Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism
title_short Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism
title_full Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism
title_fullStr Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism
title_full_unstemmed Conduct Pragmatism: Pressing Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism
title_sort conduct pragmatism: pressing beyond experientialism and lingualism
publisher European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
publishDate 2015
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.313
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/313
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