Turn Anger into Passionate Disagreement?

People can be outraged over, say, mismanagement or fraud and motivated to address such problems; they can, however, also be angry and lash out against the innocent. In addition to such unpredictability, angry people can seem literally out of their mind. My aim is to render anger intelligible and pro...

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Publicat a:URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap,
Autor principal: Cojocaru, Mara-Daria
Format: Article ou chapitre numérique
Idioma:Anglais
Publicat: European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 2020
Accés en línia:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ejpap_2147 https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.2147 urn:doi:10.4000/ejpap.2147 en https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2147 2020-12-14T01:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/fna9 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Turn Anger into Passionate Disagreement? European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy Associazione Pragma info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap Cojocaru, Mara-Daria People can be outraged over, say, mismanagement or fraud and motivated to address such problems; they can, however, also be angry and lash out against the innocent. In addition to such unpredictability, angry people can seem literally out of their mind. My aim is to render anger intelligible and productive from a social epistemological perspective: epistemological because I assume that anger involves value recognition and arouses reflection; social because I assume that the related values and inquiries involve questions of justice and/or morality. I believe that value disagreements are set up at cross purposes if we disqualify the emotional reactions of those whom we judge too unpleasant to understand. However, I also believe that we should not take anger at face value. My proposal is pragmatic for two reasons. First, and in line with classical pragmatist tenets about the role of doubt and other emotions in reasoning, it is pragmatic because I think that anger results from moral and political uncertainty and leads to a failure to understand one another and, hence, to a failure to act together. Second, my proposal is more concerned with what could be made of anger rather than focussing on what anger essentially is. In sum, I suggest that communities can regulate and use the variety of angry experiences in situations of uncertainty and conflict about moral and political values; that would be “passionate disagreement.” I explain four pragmatic considerations that go along with it and address three problems one might raise in response.
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language Anglais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
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description People can be outraged over, say, mismanagement or fraud and motivated to address such problems; they can, however, also be angry and lash out against the innocent. In addition to such unpredictability, angry people can seem literally out of their mind. My aim is to render anger intelligible and productive from a social epistemological perspective: epistemological because I assume that anger involves value recognition and arouses reflection; social because I assume that the related values and inquiries involve questions of justice and/or morality. I believe that value disagreements are set up at cross purposes if we disqualify the emotional reactions of those whom we judge too unpleasant to understand. However, I also believe that we should not take anger at face value. My proposal is pragmatic for two reasons. First, and in line with classical pragmatist tenets about the role of doubt and other emotions in reasoning, it is pragmatic because I think that anger results from moral and political uncertainty and leads to a failure to understand one another and, hence, to a failure to act together. Second, my proposal is more concerned with what could be made of anger rather than focussing on what anger essentially is. In sum, I suggest that communities can regulate and use the variety of angry experiences in situations of uncertainty and conflict about moral and political values; that would be “passionate disagreement.” I explain four pragmatic considerations that go along with it and address three problems one might raise in response.
author Cojocaru, Mara-Daria
spellingShingle Cojocaru, Mara-Daria
Turn Anger into Passionate Disagreement?
author_facet Cojocaru, Mara-Daria
author_sort Cojocaru, Mara-Daria
title Turn Anger into Passionate Disagreement?
title_short Turn Anger into Passionate Disagreement?
title_full Turn Anger into Passionate Disagreement?
title_fullStr Turn Anger into Passionate Disagreement?
title_full_unstemmed Turn Anger into Passionate Disagreement?
title_sort turn anger into passionate disagreement?
publisher European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
publishDate 2020
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.2147
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2147
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