From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions
This paper explores the specific contribution of recent literature on incomplete contracts in comparison with the acontractual Walrasian general equilibrium as well as the complete optimal contracts of the Agency theory regarding the institutional identity of agents. It underlines a tension between...
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| Τόπος έκδοσης: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ei, |
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| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
| Μορφή: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Γλώσσα: | Anglais |
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Économie et Institutions
2016
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| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:ei_709 |
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openedition |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:ei_709 https://doi.org/10.4000/ei.709 urn:doi:10.4000/ei.709 en https://journals.openedition.org/ei/709 2016-12-12T01:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/fm0d All rights reserved From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions Économie et Institutions Association Économie et Institutions info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2553-1891 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1775-2329 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ei Vahabi, Mehrdad This paper explores the specific contribution of recent literature on incomplete contracts in comparison with the acontractual Walrasian general equilibrium as well as the complete optimal contracts of the Agency theory regarding the institutional identity of agents. It underlines a tension between the theoretical justification of contractual incompleteness on the one hand, and rationality postulate, on the other hand. It concludes the relevance of bounded rationality assumption to overcome some logical incoherencies of present incomplete contracts literature. Ce texte explore la contribution spécifique de la littérature récente concernant les contrats incomplets par rapport à l’équilibre général walrasien non contractuel et les contrats complets optimaux de la théorie de l’agence quant à l’identité institutionnelle des agents. Il souligne une tension entre la justification théorique de l’incomplétude contractuelle d’une part, et le postulat de la rationalité, d’autre part. Il conclut la pertinence de l’hypothèse de la rationalité limitée afin de pallier les incohérences logiques de la littérature présente sur les contrats incomplets. Ainsi l’intégration de l’identité institutionnelle des agents dans la théorie économique requiert l’acceptation de deux conditions : 1) l’incomplétude des contrats; 2) la rationalité limitée. |
| collection |
OpenEdition Journal |
| language |
Anglais |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/ |
| description |
This paper explores the specific contribution of recent literature on incomplete contracts in comparison with the acontractual Walrasian general equilibrium as well as the complete optimal contracts of the Agency theory regarding the institutional identity of agents. It underlines a tension between the theoretical justification of contractual incompleteness on the one hand, and rationality postulate, on the other hand. It concludes the relevance of bounded rationality assumption to overcome some logical incoherencies of present incomplete contracts literature. |
| author |
Vahabi, Mehrdad |
| spellingShingle |
Vahabi, Mehrdad From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions |
| author_facet |
Vahabi, Mehrdad |
| author_sort |
Vahabi, Mehrdad |
| title |
From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions |
| title_short |
From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions |
| title_full |
From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions |
| title_fullStr |
From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions |
| title_full_unstemmed |
From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions |
| title_sort |
from walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts: making sense of institutions |
| publisher |
Économie et Institutions |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| container_title |
URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ei |
| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ei.709 https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/ei/709 |
| _version_ |
1877242436624842752 |