Reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: Truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and Handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional

Reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: Truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and Handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional

How do people go about in evaluating the consistency of their beliefs? Do people reason from or do they reason about their beliefs in judging whether they are compatible, or both? The paper investigates how people evaluate belief in contrary conditionals and .  Experiment 1 (N=141) indicates people...

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প্রধান লেখক: Schroyens, Walter
বিন্যাস: Article ou chapitre numérique
ভাষা:Anglais
প্রকাশিত: Current psychology letters 2010
বিষয়গুলি:
conditionals
special pleading
compatibility
opposite beliefs
reasoning
অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:cpl_4948 https://doi.org/10.4000/cpl.4948 urn:doi:10.4000/cpl.4948 en https://journals.openedition.org/cpl/4948 2010-07-07T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/ehj3 All rights reserved Reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: Truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and Handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional Current psychology letters Centre PsyCLÉ info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1379-6100 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1376-2095 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/cpl Schroyens, Walter conditionals special pleading compatibility opposite beliefs reasoning How do people go about in evaluating the consistency of their beliefs? Do people reason from or do they reason about their beliefs in judging whether they are compatible, or both? The paper investigates how people evaluate belief in contrary conditionals and .  Experiment 1 (N=141) indicates people do not use a notion of possibility-based compatibility according to which claims are compatible when they share a common possibility: After being given this definition, there was no improvement of compatibility judgments even though more than 60% confirmed a shared possibility. Experiment 2 (N = 95) and Experiment 3 (N=93) test the alternative truth-based notion of compatibility, according to which contrary conditionals are incompatible because they cannot be true at the same time. The sets people construct for a true conditional invariably include “A and C” cases (Experiment 2) and “if A then C” is judged “un-assertable” about sets that do no include such cases (Experiment 3). Such “A and C” cases are at the same time impossible when  "if A then not-C" is true. Findings thus suggest contrary conditionals are judged incompatible because they cannot be true at the same time. Comment évalue-t-on la cohérence de nos croyances? Est-ce qu'on raisonne en prenant nos croyances pour vraies ou les remet-on en question afin de juger si elles sont compatibles? L'article présente une recherche sur l'évaluation des croyances en deux conditionnelles contraires: "si A alors C" et "si A alors non C". Expérience 1 (N = 141) montre que les gens n'utilisent pas une notion de compatibilité-des-possibilités, selon laquelle deux assertions sont compatibles quand elles ont une possibilité partagée: Après avoir accepté cette définition, il n'y pas d’augmentation de jugements de compatibilité même si plus de 60% affirment une possibilité partagée. Les Expérience 2 (N = 95) et 3 (N = 93) testent la notion de compatibilité-de-vérité, selon laquelle des expressions sont incompatibles quand elles ne peuvent être vraies en même moment.  Les ensembles de cas qu’elles composent pour un conditionnel vrai incluent les cas (Expérience 2) et est jugé "non-assertif" pour des ensembles qui n’incluent pas ce genre de cas. Les cases sont en même temps impossible quand est vrai. Les résultats confirment ainsi que les conditionnels contraires sont jugés incompatibles parce qu’ils ne peuvent pas être vrais en même temps.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Anglais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic conditionals
special pleading
compatibility
opposite beliefs
reasoning
spellingShingle conditionals
special pleading
compatibility
opposite beliefs
reasoning
Schroyens, Walter
Reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: Truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and Handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional
description How do people go about in evaluating the consistency of their beliefs? Do people reason from or do they reason about their beliefs in judging whether they are compatible, or both? The paper investigates how people evaluate belief in contrary conditionals and .  Experiment 1 (N=141) indicates people do not use a notion of possibility-based compatibility according to which claims are compatible when they share a common possibility: After being given this definition, there was no improvement of compatibility judgments even though more than 60% confirmed a shared possibility. Experiment 2 (N = 95) and Experiment 3 (N=93) test the alternative truth-based notion of compatibility, according to which contrary conditionals are incompatible because they cannot be true at the same time. The sets people construct for a true conditional invariably include “A and C” cases (Experiment 2) and “if A then C” is judged “un-assertable” about sets that do no include such cases (Experiment 3). Such “A and C” cases are at the same time impossible when  "if A then not-C" is true. Findings thus suggest contrary conditionals are judged incompatible because they cannot be true at the same time.
author Schroyens, Walter
author_facet Schroyens, Walter
author_sort Schroyens, Walter
title Reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: Truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and Handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional
title_short Reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: Truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and Handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional
title_full Reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: Truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and Handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional
title_fullStr Reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: Truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and Handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional
title_full_unstemmed Reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: Truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and Handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional
title_sort reasoning from or reasoning about beliefs: truth-based or possibility-based compatibility judgments and handley et al.’s (2006) litmus test of the suppositional conditional
publisher Current psychology letters
publishDate 2010
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/cpl
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/cpl.4948
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/cpl/4948
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