Is Equal Protection a Language Game?
The purpose of this contribution is to provide an insight into the semantics of the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution as interpreted by the US Supreme Court, how it has been submitted to the vagaries of context and opinions, as the Justices are speakers of the lang...
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| 出版年: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/angles, |
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| 第一著者: | |
| フォーマット: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| 言語: | Anglais |
| 出版事項: |
Angles
2020
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:angles_1748 |
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openedition |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:angles_1748 https://doi.org/10.4000/angles.1748 urn:doi:10.4000/angles.1748 en https://journals.openedition.org/angles/1748 2020-07-16T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/9n0e https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Is Equal Protection a Language Game? Angles Société des Anglicistes de l'Enseignement Supérieur info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2274-2042 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/angles O’Connell, Anne-Marie Wittgenstein Ludwig droit application de règle jugement jeu de langage métaphorisation sémantisme justice Ricœur Paul Constitution américaine Cour Suprême des États-Unis égale protection Wittgenstein Ludwig law rule-following adjudication language games metaphoricity semanticism justice Ricœur Paul Constitution of the United States Supreme Court of the United States Equal Protection The purpose of this contribution is to provide an insight into the semantics of the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution as interpreted by the US Supreme Court, how it has been submitted to the vagaries of context and opinions, as the Justices are speakers of the language of law. Legal interpretation will be approached in Part 1 via the exploration of “grammar” and “rules” that have produced contrasted and sometimes ambiguous results as expressed in the Court’s decisions, following Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of the “language game.” Such a notion can be seen as the substance that shapes the identity and the memory of groups that have been differently affected by legal decisions. Part 2 will show how the constitutional clause is structured in relation to its meaning and its complex relation with time, as defined by French philosopher Paul Ricœur. Conversely, claiming that society exerts some influence on the law is equally valid. Part 3 will address the question raised by Thomas Nagel, whether a law that gives “equal opportunities” to a group by means of “preferential treatment” is compatible with justice. L’objectif de cet article est d’analyser le sémantisme de la Clause d’Égale Protection du 14ème Amendement de la Constitution des États-Unis selon l’interprétation qu’en donne la Cour Suprême en montrant combien cette interprétation a varié selon le contexte historique et les jugements (opinions) des juges, dépositaires du langage du droit. La première partie sera consacrée à la manière dont l’interprétation en droit a fourni des résultats contrastés et divers grâce à l’étude de sa « grammaire » et de ses « règles » en s’appuyant sur l'analyse du concept wittgensteinien de « jeu de langage ». On peut voir dans cette notion l’ingrédient central qui a forgé l’identité et la mémoire collective de groupes d’individus affectés de différentes façons par les décisions de justice en matière d’égale protection. La deuxième partie s’attachera à montrer que le sens de la clause constitutionnelle est intimement lié aux différentes perceptions subjectives du temps et de la mémoire historiques, tels que ces notions sont définies par Paul Ricœur. A l’inverse, il est tout aussi vrai que la société exerce une très forte influence sur le droit et la loi. C’est ainsi que la troisième partie tentera de répondre à la question, soulevée par Thomas Nagel, de savoir si des mesures de « discrimination positive » sont compatibles avec la notion de justice. |
| collection |
OpenEdition Journal |
| language |
Anglais |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/ |
| topic |
Wittgenstein Ludwig droit application de règle jugement jeu de langage métaphorisation sémantisme justice Ricœur Paul Constitution américaine Cour Suprême des États-Unis égale protection Wittgenstein Ludwig law rule-following adjudication language games metaphoricity semanticism justice Ricœur Paul Constitution of the United States Supreme Court of the United States Equal Protection |
| spellingShingle |
Wittgenstein Ludwig droit application de règle jugement jeu de langage métaphorisation sémantisme justice Ricœur Paul Constitution américaine Cour Suprême des États-Unis égale protection Wittgenstein Ludwig law rule-following adjudication language games metaphoricity semanticism justice Ricœur Paul Constitution of the United States Supreme Court of the United States Equal Protection O’Connell, Anne-Marie Is Equal Protection a Language Game? |
| description |
The purpose of this contribution is to provide an insight into the semantics of the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution as interpreted by the US Supreme Court, how it has been submitted to the vagaries of context and opinions, as the Justices are speakers of the language of law. Legal interpretation will be approached in Part 1 via the exploration of “grammar” and “rules” that have produced contrasted and sometimes ambiguous results as expressed in the Court’s decisions, following Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of the “language game.” Such a notion can be seen as the substance that shapes the identity and the memory of groups that have been differently affected by legal decisions. Part 2 will show how the constitutional clause is structured in relation to its meaning and its complex relation with time, as defined by French philosopher Paul Ricœur. Conversely, claiming that society exerts some influence on the law is equally valid. Part 3 will address the question raised by Thomas Nagel, whether a law that gives “equal opportunities” to a group by means of “preferential treatment” is compatible with justice. |
| author |
O’Connell, Anne-Marie |
| author_facet |
O’Connell, Anne-Marie |
| author_sort |
O’Connell, Anne-Marie |
| title |
Is Equal Protection a Language Game? |
| title_short |
Is Equal Protection a Language Game? |
| title_full |
Is Equal Protection a Language Game? |
| title_fullStr |
Is Equal Protection a Language Game? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Is Equal Protection a Language Game? |
| title_sort |
is equal protection a language game? |
| publisher |
Angles |
| publishDate |
2020 |
| container_title |
URI:https://journals.openedition.org/angles |
| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/angles.1748 https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/angles/1748 |
| _version_ |
1877293948541599744 |