Diviser pour mieux gouverner : un argument en défense d’un fédéralisme polycentrique
Polycentric orders, particularly federal organizations, grant significant autonomy to individual jurisdictions. Several arguments are generally put forward to defend the superiority of such orders over their monocentric alternatives, first an epistemic argument relating to the use of dispersed knowl...
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
| Publicat: |
2024
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | Polycentric orders, particularly federal organizations, grant significant autonomy to individual jurisdictions. Several arguments are generally put forward to defend the superiority of such orders over their monocentric alternatives, first an epistemic argument relating to the use of dispersed knowledge in complex societies; a political argument emphasizing emancipation from a unified sovereign power; or a democratic argument highlighting the possibility of increased local self-government. These fundamental arguments, however, come up against significant limitations. I propose an additional argument that maintains that federalist polycentric orders can also be antifragile, and strengthen themselves through multiple experiments by various jurisdictions. Far from proposing a homogeneous model of society, this socio-political order allows for a diversity of institutional realizations of socio-political ideals. |
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