In memoriam Jean-Blaise Grize (1922-2013)
An influential objection to a virtue ethics criterion of right action claims that such a criterion cannot account for duties of self-improvement. In this paper, I argue that examining the moral status of our analogous obligations regarding shame helps to reveal how oughts of self-improvement are act...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprache: | Français |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2014
|
| Online Zugang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| id |
cairn-RIP_268_0113 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
cairn |
| spelling |
cairn-RIP_268_0113RIPRevue internationale de philosophie https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2014-2-page-113?lang=fr https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.268.0113 In memoriam Jean-Blaise Grize (1922-2013) Herman, Thierry2014 fre Revue internationale de philosophie | 268 | 2 | 2014-06-01 | p. 113-113 | 0048-8143 RIP_26883 An influential objection to a virtue ethics criterion of right action claims that such a criterion cannot account for duties of self-improvement. In this paper, I argue that examining the moral status of our analogous obligations regarding shame helps to reveal how oughts of self-improvement are actually morally inferior to oughts of moral excellence. Because agents who meet their obligations regarding shame and self-improvement are not plausibly regarded as displaying a moral excellence on a par with that of the virtuous agent, I argue that these are not cases of moral excellence which a virtue ethics criterion of rightness is to be rejected for failing to accommodate.Cairn free access |
| language |
Français |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/Cairn/ |
| description |
An influential objection to a virtue ethics criterion of right action claims that such a criterion cannot account for duties of self-improvement. In this paper, I argue that examining the moral status of our analogous obligations regarding shame helps to reveal how oughts of self-improvement are actually morally inferior to oughts of moral excellence. Because agents who meet their obligations regarding shame and self-improvement are not plausibly regarded as displaying a moral excellence on a par with that of the virtuous agent, I argue that these are not cases of moral excellence which a virtue ethics criterion of rightness is to be rejected for failing to accommodate. |
| author |
Herman, Thierry |
| spellingShingle |
Herman, Thierry In memoriam Jean-Blaise Grize (1922-2013) |
| author_facet |
Herman, Thierry |
| author_sort |
Herman, Thierry |
| title |
In memoriam Jean-Blaise Grize (1922-2013) |
| title_short |
In memoriam Jean-Blaise Grize (1922-2013) |
| title_full |
In memoriam Jean-Blaise Grize (1922-2013) |
| title_fullStr |
In memoriam Jean-Blaise Grize (1922-2013) |
| title_full_unstemmed |
In memoriam Jean-Blaise Grize (1922-2013) |
| title_sort |
in memoriam jean-blaise grize (1922-2013) |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| container_title |
|
| container_issue |
|
| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2014-2-page-113?lang=fr https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.268.0113 |
| _version_ |
1877246683159461888 |