Sidgwick on Virtue
Sidgwick’s great work The Methods of Ethics contains a great deal of insightful discussion of virtue and the virtues, though of course Sidgwick’s own ethics could not plausibly be described as a form of virtue ethics. This paper critically discusses in particular his chapter ‘Virtue and Duty’, whic...
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2014
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| גישה מקוונת: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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cairn-RIP_267_0021RIPRevue internationale de philosophie https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2014-1-page-21?lang=en https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.267.0021 Sidgwick on Virtue Crisp, Roger2014 fre Revue internationale de philosophie | 267 | 1 | 2014-04-01 | p. 21-36 | 0048-8143 RIP_26775 Sidgwick’s great work The Methods of Ethics contains a great deal of insightful discussion of virtue and the virtues, though of course Sidgwick’s own ethics could not plausibly be described as a form of virtue ethics. This paper critically discusses in particular his chapter ‘Virtue and Duty’, which provides a preamble to his long and detailed discussion of common-sense morality. Topics covered include: Sidgwick’s distinction between objective and subjective rightness; virtue and duty; supererogation; virtue, action, and emotion; virtuous motivation; the importance of cultivating virtue; moral judgement and codifiability. The paper concludes that Sidgwick failed properly to recognize the role of practical wisdom in an Aristotelian ethics of virtue.Cairn free access |
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Français |
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Article ou chapitre numérique |
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0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/Cairn/ |
| description |
Sidgwick’s great work The Methods of Ethics contains a great deal of insightful discussion of virtue and the virtues, though of course Sidgwick’s own ethics could not plausibly be described as a form of virtue ethics. This paper critically discusses in particular his chapter ‘Virtue and Duty’, which provides a preamble to his long and detailed discussion of common-sense morality. Topics covered include: Sidgwick’s distinction between objective and subjective rightness; virtue and duty; supererogation; virtue, action, and emotion; virtuous motivation; the importance of cultivating virtue; moral judgement and codifiability. The paper concludes that Sidgwick failed properly to recognize the role of practical wisdom in an Aristotelian ethics of virtue. |
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Crisp, Roger |
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Crisp, Roger Sidgwick on Virtue |
| author_facet |
Crisp, Roger |
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Crisp, Roger |
| title |
Sidgwick on Virtue |
| title_short |
Sidgwick on Virtue |
| title_full |
Sidgwick on Virtue |
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Sidgwick on Virtue |
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Sidgwick on Virtue |
| title_sort |
sidgwick on virtue |
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2014 |
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| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2014-1-page-21?lang=en https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.267.0021 |
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