The Puzzle in Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology
There is a hitherto under-recognized puzzle in Sidgwick’s moral epistemology: In “The Establishment of Ethical First Principles,” Sidgwick distinguishes two ( “quite distinct”) kinds of argument: bipartite arguments and criterial arguments. In Methods III, Sidgwick develops a criterial argument for...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
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| বিন্যাস: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| ভাষা: | Français |
| প্রকাশিত: |
2013
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| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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cairn-RIP_266_0421 |
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cairn |
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cairn-RIP_266_0421RIPRevue internationale de philosophie https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2013-4-page-421?lang=en https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.266.0421 The Puzzle in Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology Phillips, David2013 fre Revue internationale de philosophie | 266 | 4 | 2013-12-01 | p. 421-426 | 0048-8143 RIP_26664 There is a hitherto under-recognized puzzle in Sidgwick’s moral epistemology: In “The Establishment of Ethical First Principles,” Sidgwick distinguishes two ( “quite distinct”) kinds of argument: bipartite arguments and criterial arguments. In Methods III, Sidgwick develops a criterial argument for utilitarianism. In general, he thinks of criterial arguments as different from and more powerful than bipartite arguments. But in Methods IV II, Sidgwick considers only bipartite arguments. Why does the criterial argument for utilitarianism disappear in Methods Book IV?Cairn free access |
| language |
Français |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/Cairn/ |
| description |
There is a hitherto under-recognized puzzle in Sidgwick’s moral epistemology: In “The Establishment of Ethical First Principles,” Sidgwick distinguishes two ( “quite distinct”) kinds of argument: bipartite arguments and criterial arguments. In Methods III, Sidgwick develops a criterial argument for utilitarianism. In general, he thinks of criterial arguments as different from and more powerful than bipartite arguments. But in Methods IV II, Sidgwick considers only bipartite arguments. Why does the criterial argument for utilitarianism disappear in Methods Book IV? |
| author |
Phillips, David |
| spellingShingle |
Phillips, David The Puzzle in Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology |
| author_facet |
Phillips, David |
| author_sort |
Phillips, David |
| title |
The Puzzle in Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology |
| title_short |
The Puzzle in Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology |
| title_full |
The Puzzle in Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology |
| title_fullStr |
The Puzzle in Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Puzzle in Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology |
| title_sort |
puzzle in sidgwick's moral epistemology |
| publishDate |
2013 |
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| container_issue |
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| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2013-4-page-421?lang=en https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.266.0421 |
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