The retreat from systemic risk regulation: what explains it? (and why it was predictable)
Financial crises usually trigger a predictable cycle: first, a populist outburst that produces dramatic legislative and regulatory changes and, then, a slower counter-reaction as the financial industry gradually subjects the new reforms to a death by a thousand cuts, often with the result that littl...
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| Natura: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Lingua: | Français |
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2018
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| Accesso online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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cairn-RINDU1_184_0080RINDU1Annales des Mines - Réalités industrielles https://stm.cairn.info/revue-realites-industrielles-2018-4-page-80?lang=en https://doi.org/10.3917/rindu1.184.0080 The retreat from systemic risk regulation: what explains it? (and why it was predictable) Coffee Jr., John C.2018 fre Annales des Mines - Réalités industrielles | ovembre 2018 | 4 | 2018-10-22 | p. 80-90 | 1148-7941 RINDU1_18487 Financial crises usually trigger a predictable cycle: first, a populist outburst that produces dramatic legislative and regulatory changes and, then, a slower counter-reaction as the financial industry gradually subjects the new reforms to a death by a thousand cuts, often with the result that little remains. This cycle – here called the “Regulatory Sine Curve” – can be traced back to the South Sea Bubble in 1720. In the aftermath of 2008, this cycle seems to be again in progress in the United States, as many of the Dodd-Frank Act’s reforms have either gone unimplemented or have been partially repealed. But the same cycle does not appear to be occurring in Europe. This brief essay analyzes these differing responses and seeks to explain why Europe seems better insulated against counter-reaction.Cairn free access |
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Français |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/Cairn/ |
| description |
Financial crises usually trigger a predictable cycle: first, a populist outburst that produces dramatic legislative and regulatory changes and, then, a slower counter-reaction as the financial industry gradually subjects the new reforms to a death by a thousand cuts, often with the result that little remains. This cycle – here called the “Regulatory Sine Curve” – can be traced back to the South Sea Bubble in 1720. In the aftermath of 2008, this cycle seems to be again in progress in the United States, as many of the Dodd-Frank Act’s reforms have either gone unimplemented or have been partially repealed. But the same cycle does not appear to be occurring in Europe. This brief essay analyzes these differing responses and seeks to explain why Europe seems better insulated against counter-reaction. |
| author |
Coffee Jr., John C. |
| spellingShingle |
Coffee Jr., John C. The retreat from systemic risk regulation: what explains it? (and why it was predictable) |
| author_facet |
Coffee Jr., John C. |
| author_sort |
Coffee Jr., John C. |
| title |
The retreat from systemic risk regulation: what explains it? (and why it was predictable) |
| title_short |
The retreat from systemic risk regulation: what explains it? (and why it was predictable) |
| title_full |
The retreat from systemic risk regulation: what explains it? (and why it was predictable) |
| title_fullStr |
The retreat from systemic risk regulation: what explains it? (and why it was predictable) |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The retreat from systemic risk regulation: what explains it? (and why it was predictable) |
| title_sort |
retreat from systemic risk regulation: what explains it? (and why it was predictable) |
| publishDate |
2018 |
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| container_issue |
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| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://stm.cairn.info/revue-realites-industrielles-2018-4-page-80?lang=en https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/rindu1.184.0080 |
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