La justice économique est-elle dissuasive ?
Based on four real and recent cases (Deliveroo, France Télécom, Dieselgate, Mediator), the article examines the level of deterrence necessary to dissuade a company from making an economic decision that disregards a fundamental right and could cause mass harm. First, it calculates the overall cost of...
Guardat en:
| Autors principals: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
| Publicat: |
2025
|
| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | Based on four real and recent cases (Deliveroo, France Télécom, Dieselgate, Mediator), the article examines the level of deterrence necessary to dissuade a company from making an economic decision that disregards a fundamental right and could cause mass harm. First, it calculates the overall cost of the legal sanctions imposed in these four cases and the cost savings sought by the company through the alleged misconduct. Next, it estimates what the “optimal sanction” would have been, according to Gary Becker’s economic deterrence model, and discusses the appropriateness of such a level of sanction. Finally, if deterrence through financial penalties remains insufficient or is economically undesirable due to its repercussions, restorative justice may offer potential avenues to explore in order to make the economy more ethical and redistributive. The remedy under common civil liability law allows the judge to be creative. |
|---|