Quel scepticisme pour Margaret Cavendish? Le probabilisme de la connaissance de Cavendish face à celui de la Royal Society
For Margaret Cavendish knowledge in natural philosophy can only amount to probability and never to certainty. Cavendish’s probabilism might seem to echo some of the stances of the Royal Society on the uncertainty of knowledge in natural philosophy. However, Cavendish’s probabilism is grounded in her...
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| Tác giả chính: | |
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| Định dạng: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Français |
| Được phát hành: |
2024
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| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |