Quel scepticisme pour Margaret Cavendish? Le probabilisme de la connaissance de Cavendish face à celui de la Royal Society

For Margaret Cavendish knowledge in natural philosophy can only amount to probability and never to certainty. Cavendish’s probabilism might seem to echo some of the stances of the Royal Society on the uncertainty of knowledge in natural philosophy. However, Cavendish’s probabilism is grounded in her...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Colomban, Dinh-Vinh
Formato: Article ou chapitre numérique
Idioma:Français
Publicado em: 2024
Acesso em linha:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM

Internet

https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-histoire-des-sciences-2024-2-page-307?lang=fr
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/rhs.772.0307