Quel scepticisme pour Margaret Cavendish? Le probabilisme de la connaissance de Cavendish face à celui de la Royal Society

For Margaret Cavendish knowledge in natural philosophy can only amount to probability and never to certainty. Cavendish’s probabilism might seem to echo some of the stances of the Royal Society on the uncertainty of knowledge in natural philosophy. However, Cavendish’s probabilism is grounded in her...

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore principale: Colomban, Dinh-Vinh
Natura: Article ou chapitre numérique
Lingua:Français
Pubblicazione: 2024
Accesso online:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM

Accesso online

https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-histoire-des-sciences-2024-2-page-307?lang=fr
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/rhs.772.0307