Quel scepticisme pour Margaret Cavendish? Le probabilisme de la connaissance de Cavendish face à celui de la Royal Society

For Margaret Cavendish knowledge in natural philosophy can only amount to probability and never to certainty. Cavendish’s probabilism might seem to echo some of the stances of the Royal Society on the uncertainty of knowledge in natural philosophy. However, Cavendish’s probabilism is grounded in her...

पूर्ण विवरण

में बचाया:
ग्रंथसूची विवरण
मुख्य लेखक: Colomban, Dinh-Vinh
स्वरूप: Article ou chapitre numérique
भाषा:Français
प्रकाशित: 2024
ऑनलाइन पहुंच:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM

इंटरनेट

https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-histoire-des-sciences-2024-2-page-307?lang=fr
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/rhs.772.0307