I.2. La coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la Judenpolitik, 1940-1942

I.2. La coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la Judenpolitik, 1940-1942

The reaction of the French and the country’s administration to the German occupation during WWII is too often reduced to either collaboration or resistance. However, recent Holocaust research has shown that European societies both contributed to and benefited from the persecution of Jews without nec...

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Auteurs principaux: Meyer, Michaël, Chazal, Tilman
Format: Article ou chapitre numérique
Langue:Français
Publié: 2020
Accès en ligne:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
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spelling cairn-RHSHO_212_0059RHSHORevue d’Histoire de la Shoah https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-histoire-de-la-shoah-2020-2-page-59?lang=fr https://doi.org/10.3917/rhsho.212.0059 I.2. La coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la Judenpolitik, 1940-1942 Meyer, MichaëlChazal, Tilman2020 fre Revue d’Histoire de la Shoah | 212 | 2 | 2020-09-15 | p. 59-74 | 2111-885X RHSHO_21297 The reaction of the French and the country’s administration to the German occupation during WWII is too often reduced to either collaboration or resistance. However, recent Holocaust research has shown that European societies both contributed to and benefited from the persecution of Jews without necessarily being pro-German. By focusing on France, Michael Mayer demonstrates that the German concept of occupation was based on the fact that Germany could not implement the Holocaust in France without a relatively high degree of French cooperation. Furthermore, he shows that the French administration took German anti-Semitic measures into their own hands in 1940 and 1941. Through this strategy, the French were able to curb German influence in France at the expense of the persecuted. At the same time, the Vichy government enacted its own anti-Semitic policies that were aimed at segregating French Jews through race-specific legislation.In 1940 and 1941, the relationship between France and Germany oscillated between a surprisingly high degree of cooperation (despite the French government’s generally anti-German attitude) and the relatively large room for maneuver that the Vichy government used to implement French anti-Semitic policies. However, from 1942 on, the German occupational policy increasingly curtailed France’s semi-autonomous status. In the end, Vichy France was no more than a half-hearted participant in the Holocaust.Cairn free access
language Français
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/Cairn/
description The reaction of the French and the country’s administration to the German occupation during WWII is too often reduced to either collaboration or resistance. However, recent Holocaust research has shown that European societies both contributed to and benefited from the persecution of Jews without necessarily being pro-German. By focusing on France, Michael Mayer demonstrates that the German concept of occupation was based on the fact that Germany could not implement the Holocaust in France without a relatively high degree of French cooperation. Furthermore, he shows that the French administration took German anti-Semitic measures into their own hands in 1940 and 1941. Through this strategy, the French were able to curb German influence in France at the expense of the persecuted. At the same time, the Vichy government enacted its own anti-Semitic policies that were aimed at segregating French Jews through race-specific legislation.In 1940 and 1941, the relationship between France and Germany oscillated between a surprisingly high degree of cooperation (despite the French government’s generally anti-German attitude) and the relatively large room for maneuver that the Vichy government used to implement French anti-Semitic policies. However, from 1942 on, the German occupational policy increasingly curtailed France’s semi-autonomous status. In the end, Vichy France was no more than a half-hearted participant in the Holocaust.
author Meyer, Michaël
Chazal, Tilman
spellingShingle Meyer, Michaël
Chazal, Tilman
I.2. La coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la Judenpolitik, 1940-1942
author_facet Meyer, Michaël
Chazal, Tilman
author_sort Meyer, Michaël
title I.2. La coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la Judenpolitik, 1940-1942
title_short I.2. La coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la Judenpolitik, 1940-1942
title_full I.2. La coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la Judenpolitik, 1940-1942
title_fullStr I.2. La coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la Judenpolitik, 1940-1942
title_full_unstemmed I.2. La coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la Judenpolitik, 1940-1942
title_sort i.2. la coopération franco-allemande dans le domaine de la judenpolitik, 1940-1942
publishDate 2020
container_title
container_issue
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-histoire-de-la-shoah-2020-2-page-59?lang=fr
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/rhsho.212.0059
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