Algorithmes de prix et signaux collusifs : approches économique et concurrentielle
This article examines the impact of online platforms in the legal services market, focusing on two key roles: intermediary and service provider. In the first role, the platform gives litigants access to an online directory and offers them assistance in their search for a lawyer. We study three regim...
Gardado en:
| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Formato: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Acceso en liña: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | This article examines the impact of online platforms in the legal services market, focusing on two key roles: intermediary and service provider. In the first role, the platform gives litigants access to an online directory and offers them assistance in their search for a lawyer. We study three regimes regarding user feedback on lawyers. We determine that moderating litigants’ comments is preferable to maximize access to legal services, but the platform’s chosen regime sometimes minimizes this access. In the second role, the platform offers standardized solutions tailored to specific legal problems. We show that if the price of the lawyers’ services is high, the platform can increase access to legal services and the total surplus of litigants. Additionally, the platform’s presence can have an indirect positive effect on access to justice as it leads to a decrease in lawyers’ fees. However, integrating the platform’s services with those of the lawyers increases the platform’s profit but reduces access to legal services. |
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