La reprise sceptique du cogito cartésien et la self-reliance chez Emerson
The aim of this paper is to show how Stanley Cavell’s reading of Emerson’s “Self-Reliance” reinvents the concept of the self as associated to skepticism. In this essay, the structure of “self-reliance” emphasizes a skeptical alternation between authorship and passivity, saying and quoting,...
Gardado en:
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| Formato: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
| Publicado: |
2002
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| Acceso en liña: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | The aim of this paper is to show how Stanley Cavell’s reading of
Emerson’s “Self-Reliance” reinvents the concept of the self as associated to
skepticism. In this essay, the structure of “self-reliance” emphasizes a
skeptical alternation between authorship and passivity, saying and quoting,
subjection to conformity and genius, that denies the Cartesian “cogito”, and
allows a new understanding of our relation to our self as one of acknowledging,
instead of knowing. |
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