Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ?
For Better or for Worse ? The Role of Parliament in the Budgetary Process of Developing Countries Can parliaments contribute efficiently to budgetary processes while preserving fiscal discipline ? Greater budgetary transparency and a stable taxation system are crucial challenges for emerging econo...
محفوظ في:
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| التنسيق: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| اللغة: | Français |
| منشور في: |
2006
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| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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cairn-RFAP_117_0149 |
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cairn-RFAP_117_0149RFAPRevue française d'administration publique https://droit.cairn.info/revue-francaise-d-administration-publique-2006-1-page-149?lang=fr https://doi.org/10.3917/rfap.117.0149 Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ? Santiso, Carlos2006 fre Revue française d'administration publique | 117 | 1 | 2006-03-01 | p. 149-185 | 0152-7401 RFAP_11715 For Better or for Worse ? The Role of Parliament in the Budgetary Process of Developing Countries Can parliaments contribute efficiently to budgetary processes while preserving fiscal discipline ? Greater budgetary transparency and a stable taxation system are crucial challenges for emerging economies concerned with the efficient management of public finance and the fight against corruption. Considerably neglected during the first stage of economic reforms, legislative budgetary institutions reappeared with the second wave of reforms in financial administrations. However, due to the predominance of their executive rôle as well as their own lack of knowledge on the subject, parliaments often have little to do with budgetary matters. Although they possess a wide range of powers in budgetary affairs, only rarely do they manage to make efficient and responsible use of them. The article examines the contribution of parliaments to budgetary processes in developing countries with both presidential regimes and centralized budgetary systems, and evaluates the conditions and constraints of a greater parliamentary role in budgetary matters. It analyses the political economy of budgetary processes in Latin America, underlining the risks of insufficient government participation in budget management and the advantages of parliamentary control of public finances. It argues that in Latin America as elsewhere, the main challenge of parliamentary participation in the budgetary process consists in preserving the advantage of a strong executive authority able to ensure fiscal discipline, while at the same time procuring the restraint and institutional counterbalance that guarantee financial responsibility, the rendering of accounts and democratic control. Good fiscal governance is the fruit of a harmonious blend of government prerogatives and parliamentary control.Cairn free access |
| language |
Français |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/Cairn/ |
| description |
For Better or for Worse ? The Role of Parliament in the Budgetary Process
of Developing Countries
Can parliaments contribute efficiently to budgetary processes while preserving fiscal
discipline ? Greater budgetary transparency and a stable taxation system are crucial
challenges for emerging economies concerned with the efficient management of public
finance and the fight against corruption. Considerably neglected during the first stage of
economic reforms, legislative budgetary institutions reappeared with the second wave of
reforms in financial administrations. However, due to the predominance of their
executive rôle as well as their own lack of knowledge on the subject, parliaments often
have little to do with budgetary matters. Although they possess a wide range of powers
in budgetary affairs, only rarely do they manage to make efficient and responsible use of
them. The article examines the contribution of parliaments to budgetary processes in
developing countries with both presidential regimes and centralized budgetary systems,
and evaluates the conditions and constraints of a greater parliamentary role in budgetary
matters. It analyses the political economy of budgetary processes in Latin America,
underlining the risks of insufficient government participation in budget management and
the advantages of parliamentary control of public finances. It argues that in Latin
America as elsewhere, the main challenge of parliamentary participation in the budgetary
process consists in preserving the advantage of a strong executive authority able to
ensure fiscal discipline, while at the same time procuring the restraint and institutional
counterbalance that guarantee financial responsibility, the rendering of accounts and
democratic control. Good fiscal governance is the fruit of a harmonious blend of
government prerogatives and parliamentary control. |
| author |
Santiso, Carlos |
| spellingShingle |
Santiso, Carlos Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ? |
| author_facet |
Santiso, Carlos |
| author_sort |
Santiso, Carlos |
| title |
Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ? |
| title_short |
Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ? |
| title_full |
Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ? |
| title_fullStr |
Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ? |
| title_sort |
pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ? |
| publishDate |
2006 |
| container_title |
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| container_issue |
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| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://droit.cairn.info/revue-francaise-d-administration-publique-2006-1-page-149?lang=fr https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.3917/rfap.117.0149 |
| _version_ |
1877246535882768384 |