Web and internet economics : 9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013, proceedings
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013, held in Cambridge, MA, USA, in December 2013. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 150 submissions and cover research in...
Guardat en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Altres autors: | |
| Format: | Livre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
| Publicat: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2013.
Cham : Springer Nature |
| Col·lecció: | Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
8289 |
| Accés en línia: | Accès sur la plateforme de l'éditeur Accès sur la plateforme Istex Accès Université d'Orléans Accès INSA CVL |
| Nota: |
Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • Web and Internet Economics, Texte imprimé, 9783642450457 • Web and Internet Economics, Texte imprimé, 9783642450471 |
Taula de continguts:
- The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem
- Polylogarithmic Supports are required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria
- The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship
- Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
- Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods
- On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games
- Trading Agent Kills Market Information: Evidence from Online Social Lending
- Designing Markets for Daily Deals
- The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
- The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited
- Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
- Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
- Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?
- Resolving Braess's Paradox in Random Networks
- A protocol for cutting matroids like cakes
- Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
- Price of Anarchy for the N-player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions.