Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions
With the advent of the Internet and other modern information and communication technologies, a magnificent opportunity has opened up for introducing new, innovative models of commerce, markets, and business. Creating these innovations calls for significant interdisciplinary interaction among researc...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Livre numérique |
| Lenguaje: | Anglais |
| Publicado: |
London :
Springer London
[20..].
Cham : Springer Nature |
| Edición: | 1st ed. 2009. |
| Colección: | Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing
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| Acceso en línea: | Accès sur la plateforme de l'éditeur Accès sur la plateforme Istex Accès Université d'Orléans Accès INSA CVL |
| Nota: |
Description d'après consultation du 14 mars 2012 Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) Archives Springer e-books (Licence nationale) |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions, by Hastagiri Prakash, Ramasuri Narayanam, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari., London, Springer-Verlag London, 2009, 1 vol (274 p.), Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing, 978-1-84800-937-0 • Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions, Texte imprimé, 9781849968072 • Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions, Texte imprimé, 9781848009448 • Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions, by Hastagiri Prakash, Ramasuri Narayanam, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari., London, Springer-Verlag London, 2009, 1 vol (274 p.), Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing, 978-1-84800-937-0 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- From the contents Motivating Problems in Network Economics Foundations of Mechanisms Design Strategic Form Games Dominant Strategy Equilibria Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Bayesian Games Social Choice Functions Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem Properties of Social Choice Functions Bayesian Implementation Revenue Equivalence Theorem Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions Internet Advertising Sponsored Search Auction Individual Rationality Computational Complexity Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing The G-DSIC Mechanism The G-BIC Mechanism G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol Key Applications Areas