Game Theory for Applied Economists

Game Theory for Applied Economists

Résumé de l'éditeur : This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of g...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Gibbons, Robert, 1958-
Formato: Livre numérique
Idioma:Anglais
Publicado em: New Jersey : Princeton University Press 1992.
Assuntos:
Mathématiques économiques
Économie politique > Modèles mathématiques
Théorie des jeux
Acesso em linha:Accès Université Orléans et IFPM
Nota: Description d'après la consultation du 270918
Titre provenant de l'écran-titre
L'impression du document génère 205 p.
Cyberlibris (ScholarVox) corpus sciences économiques et gestion
Autres localisations: Voir dans le Sudoc
Edition sous un autre format:• Game theory for applied economists, Robert Gibbons, 1992, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1 vol. (XIII-267 p.), Princeton Paperbacks, 978-0-691-00395-5
Sumário:
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication Page
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Chapter 1
  • Static Games of Complete Information
  • 1.1 Basic Theory: Normal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium
  • 1.1.A Normal-Form Representation of Games
  • 1.1. B Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
  • 1.1 .C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibrium
  • 1.2 Applications
  • 1.2. A Cournot Model of Duopoly
  • 1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly
  • 1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration
  • 1.2.D The Problem of the Commons
  • 1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibrium
  • 1.3.A Mixed Strategies
  • 1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium
  • 1.4 Further Reading
  • 1.5 Problems
  • 1.6 References
  • Chapter 2
  • Dynamic Games of Complete Information
  • 2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information
  • 2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction
  • 2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly
  • 2.1.C Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm
  • 2.1.D Sequential Bargaining
  • 2.2 Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information
  • 2.2.A Theory: Subgame Perfection
  • 2.2.B Bank Runs
  • 2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition
  • 2.2.D Tournaments
  • 2.3 Repeated Games
  • 2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games
  • 2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games
  • 2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists
  • 2.3.D Efficiency Wages
  • 2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy
  • 2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information
  • 2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games
  • 2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
  • 2.5 Further Reading
  • 2.6 Problems
  • 2.7 References
  • Chapter 3
  • Static Games of Incomplete Information
  • 3.1 Theory: Static Bayesian Games and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
  • 3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information
  • 3.1.B Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games
  • 3.1.C Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
  • 3.2 Applications
  • 3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited
  • 3.2.B An Auction
  • 3.2.C A Double Auction
  • 3.3 The Revelation Principle
  • 3.4 Further Reading
  • 3.5 Problems
  • 3.6 References
  • Chapter 4
  • Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
  • 4.1 Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
  • 4.2 Signaling Games
  • 4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games
  • 4.2.B Job-Market Signaling
  • 4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure
  • 4.2.D Monetary Policy
  • 4.3 Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
  • 4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games
  • 4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
  • 4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
  • 4.4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
  • 4.5 Further Reading
  • 4.6 Problems
  • 4.7 References
  • Index

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