Game theory
Enregistré dans:
| Auteurs principaux: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Livre papier |
| Sprog: | Anglais |
| Udgivet: |
Cambridge (Mass.) ; London :
the MIT Press
C 1991.
|
| Fag: | |
| Kommentar: |
Autres tirages : 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2002 |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
Indholdsfortegnelse:
- Contient des exercices
- I. Static games of complete information
- 1. Games in strategic form and nash equilibrium
- 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium
- II. Dynamic games of complete information
- 3. Extensive-form games
- 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions
- 5. Repeated games
- III. Static ames of incomplete information
- 6. Bayesian games and bayesian equilibrium
- 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design
- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information
- 8. Equilibrium refinements : perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection
- 9. Reputation effects
- 10. Sequential bargaining under incomplete information
- V. Advanced topics
- 11. More equilibrium refinements : stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance
- 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games
- 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium
- 14. Common knowledge and games