Who wants what? : redistribution preferences in comparative perspective
Why do some people support redistributive policies such as a generous welfare state, social policy or protections for the poor, and others do not? The (often implicit) model behind much of comparative politics and political economy starts with redistribution preferences. These affect how individuals...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Livre numérique |
| Language: | Anglais |
| Published: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press
2019.
Cambridge : |
| Series: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Accès sur la plateforme Cambridge University Press Accès sur la plateforme ISTEX (corpus CUP) Accès Université d'Orléans |
| Note: |
Cambridge University Press - CUP - Corpus Science politique (Licence nationale) |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • Who wants what ?, redistribution preferences in comparative perspective, David Rueda, ..., Daniel Stegmueller, ..., 2019, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1 vol. (XVIII-280 p.), Cambridge studies in comparative politics, 978-1-108-72343-5 |
Table of Contents:
- Cover; Half-title; Series information; Title page; Copyright information; Contents; Figures; Tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Why Redistribution Preferences?; 1.2 Who Wants What?; 1.3 Analytical Strategies; 1.4 Data sources and Coverage; 1.5 Measuring Redistribution Preferences; 1.6 Measuring Income; 1.7 Where to Go from Here; Part I Material Self-Interest: Redistribution and Insurance; 2 Income, Income Expectations, Redistribution, and Insurance; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Argument; 2.2.1 Material Self-Interest: Related and Competing Arguments; 2.2.2 Our Argument 2.3 Calculating Expected Income2.3.1 Expected Income in Western Europe; 2.3.2 Expected Income in Germany and Great Britain; 3 Income Expectations as Determinants of Redistribution; 3.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence: Europe; 3.1.1 Variable Definitions; 3.1.2 Statistical Specification; 3.1.3 Results; 3.1.4 Robustness Tests; 3.2 Panel Evidence I: Germany; 3.2.1 Variable Definitions; 3.2.2 Statistical Specification; 3.2.3 Results; 3.2.4 Robustness Tests; 3.3 Panel Evidence II: United Kingdom; 3.3.1 Variable Definitions; 3.3.2 Statistical Specification; 3.3.3 Results; 3.3.4 Robustness Checks Part II Beyond Income: Externalities of Inequality4 Externalities and Redistribution; 4.1 The Argument; 4.1.1 Material Self-Interest; 4.1.2 Externality-Related Motivations; 4.1.3 Macroinequality and Fear of Crime; 4.2 Preliminary Analysis; 4.2.1 Regional Variation in Inequality and Fear of Crime; 5 Analysis of Externalities; 5.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence: Europe; 5.1.1 Variable Definitions; 5.1.2 Statistical Models; 5.1.3 Results: Inequality; 5.1.4 Results: Fear of Crime; 5.1.5 A Placebo Test; 5.1.6 Robustness Checks; 5.2 Panel Evidence: United Kingdom; 5.2.1 Variable Definitions 5.2.2 Statistical Models5.2.3 Results; 5.2.4 Robustness Checks; Part III Beyond income: Population heterogeneity; 6 Heterogeneity and Redistribution; 6.1 The Argument; 6.1.1 Material Self-Interest; 6.1.2 Altruism; 6.1.3 Identity and In-Group Altruism; 6.1.4 Altruism: Short Time-Horizon and High Stakes for the Poor; 6.2 Preliminary Analysis; 6.2.1 Heterogeneity and Redistribution; 6.2.2 Regional Heterogeneity in Western Europe and the United States; 7 Analysis of Heterogeneity; 7.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence: Europe; 7.1.1 Variable Definitions; 7.1.2 Statistical Specifications; 7.1.3 Results 7.1.4 Robustness Tests7.1.5 Additional Microlevel Implication: Immigration Attitudes; 7.2 Repeated Cross-Sectional Evidence: United States; 7.2.1 Variable Definitions; 7.2.2 Statistical Specifications; 7.2.3 Results; 7.2.4 Robustness Checks; 7.2.5 The 1996 PRWORA Reform; 7.2.6 Additional Microlevel Implications: Racial Attitudes; 7.2.7 The Crucial Role of Race; Part IV From preferences to voting; 8 The Political Consequences of Redistribution Demands; 8.1 Income, Inequality, Heterogeneity, and Redistribution Preferences; 8.2 Redistribution Preferences and Political Behavior