The Political Economy of Sovereign Default : Theory and Empirics
What do self-interested governments needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for tra...
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| Glavni autor: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Livre numérique |
| Jezik: | Anglais |
| Izdano: |
Genève :
Graduate Institute Publications
2012.
Marseille : OpenEdition |
| Serija: | eCahiers de l Institut
15 |
| Teme: | |
| Online pristup: | Ressource accessible en libre accès Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM ; Accès complet au document dans sa version HTML. Pas d'accès aux autres formats (PDF, Epub). |
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Description d'après la consultation, 2019-02-08 Titre provenant de la page de titre du document électronique La pagination de l'édition imprimée correspondante est de : [84 p.] OpenEdition Books (freemium) |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • The Political Economy of Sovereign Default, Texte imprimé, Genève, Graduate Institute Publications, 2012 |
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| 008 | 150107q2012 xxe ||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 009 | PPN182826619 | ||
| 020 | |a 9782940503087 | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Hohmann, Sebastian. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The Political Economy of Sovereign Default : |b Theory and Empirics |c Sebastian Hohmann. |
| 256 | |a Données textuelles | ||
| 260 | |a Genève : |b Graduate Institute Publications. | ||
| 260 | |a Marseille : |b OpenEdition, |c 2012. | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a eCahiers de l Institut |v 15 | |
| 500 | |a Description d'après la consultation, 2019-02-08 | ||
| 500 | |a Titre provenant de la page de titre du document électronique | ||
| 500 | |a La pagination de l'édition imprimée correspondante est de : [84 p.] | ||
| 500 | |a OpenEdition Books (freemium) | ||
| 504 | |a Bibliogr. | ||
| 506 | |a L'accès complet au document est ouvert à tous dans sa version HTML. L'accès aux autres formats (PDF, Epub) est réservé aux usagers des établissements qui en ont fait l'acquisition | ||
| 520 | |a What do self-interested governments needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The political-economy model of sovereign default developed in this ePaper shows that those governments that depend on small groups of loyalists drawn from large populations are more likely to default on sovereign debt than those governments dependent on large groups of supporters. These findings contribute to a growing body of literature on the importance of institutions in sovereign debt and default | ||
| 538 | |a Navigateur Web | ||
| 650 | |a Finances internationales | ||
| 650 | |a Dettes publiques | ||
| 650 | |a Gestion des crises | ||
| 776 | 0 | |t The Political Economy of Sovereign Default |b Texte imprimé |c Genève |n Graduate Institute Publications |d 2012 | |
| 856 | 4 | |q HTML |u http://books.openedition.org/iheid/509 |z Ressource accessible en libre accès | |
| 856 | 4 | |5 452349901:819965693 |u https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=http://books.openedition.org/iheid/509 |z Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM ; Accès complet au document dans sa version HTML. Pas d'accès aux autres formats (PDF, Epub). | |
| 997 | |0 1199949 |1 Livre numérique |a Ressource numérique |b INSA |b ENSA |c 0/Bibliothèque numérique/ |c 1/Bibliothèque numérique/Autre ressource numérique/ | ||