Believing and Accepting
(1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evid...
Enregistré dans:
| 其他作者: | |
|---|---|
| 格式: | Livre numérique |
| 語言: | Anglais |
| 出版: |
Dordrecht :
Springer Netherlands
[20..].
Cham : Springer Nature |
| 叢編: | Philosophical Studies Series
83 |
| 在線閱讀: | Accès sur la plateforme Springer Accès sur la plateforme ISTEX Accès Université d'Orléans |
| 提示: |
Springer e-books en philosophie (Licence nationale) |
| Autres localisations: | Voir dans le Sudoc |
| Edition sous un autre format: | • Believing and Accepting, Texte imprimé, 9789401057820 • Believing and accepting, edited by Pascal Engel,..., 2000, Dordrecht, Kluwer academic publishers, 1 vol. (298 p.), Philosophical studies series, 0-7923-6238-1 • Believing and Accepting, Texte imprimé, 9789401140430 |
書本目錄:
- Introduction: the Varieties of Belief and Acceptance
- The Possibility of Acceptance Without Belief
- Why Acceptance that P Does Not Entail Belief that P
- Moore's Paradox
- On Moore's Paradox
- On Wanting to Believe
- Choosing to Intend, Wanting to Believe
- Transformations of Belief
- Belief and Acceptance: A Logical Point of View
- Scientific Objectivity and the Aims of Belief
- Belief and Acceptance Revisited
- Commitments Defined with the Help of Public Concepts
- Concepts, Beliefs and Metarepresentations
- The Simulation of Belief.